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Jurimetrics, No!
by Ralph J. Rohner

As the twentieth century ends, we hear recounted the story of the
law revolution that began in the 1960's and reached its fulfillment
with the constitutional amendment that replaced the Supreme Court
with nine outstanding JUDIVACs, who formed the High-Voltage
Bench. Little-known details of these momentous events are explained.

September 6, 1968
THE A. P. dispatch was buried on
page 14. An undiscerning eye might
have missed it in the quick scan from
national news to sports. In fact, I was
digesting the details of the pennant
races on page 17 before the latent import of the 8-point headline sprang
upon my consciousness. COMPUTER
EASES LAWYER'S LOAD, it said.
I read on, unaware of the obviously
psychosomatic consequences: a New
York research firm had successfully
programmed a UNIVAC with the holdings of a million New York State appellate court decisions; by merely punching several key words onto an I.B.M.
card, the technician could coerce the
metal monster to intone accurately the
applicable law, gleaned from as many
as 120,000 cases per minute and
spewed forth at the quite injudicious
rate of 920 lines every sixty seconds.
The anonymous A.P.er made so bold as
to predict that the procedure could
save a lawyer "several weeks of library
research". Aghast at this prospect, I
re-searched the article for some glimmer of realization (by the writer) of
the potential Frankenstein's monster he
had loosed upon the legal community.
Thinking back now, I can see I must
have fallen asleep naturally. (It had
been one of those weeks, and I was
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tired.) But I still recall the eerie,
haunting aura of doom that settled on
my mind as the uses of this contrivance revealed themselves to me: a
whirring, steel-grey, mechanical fear
seized me while I watched an army of
dial-faced, undigital jurists marching
down the sunlight to my desk....

September 6, 1998
The revolution in law during the last
thirty years has been phenomenal. I
hope this word tour adequately describes it.
We are in the office of the Chief Justice of the United States. The leather
chair last occupied during 1988 is
the only reminder of the Court of a
decade ago. The rest of the office
has been dedicated as a national memorial and contains the original
1968-UNIVAC (graciously donated by
Sperry Rand Corporation before it
merged with West Publishing Company in 1981). This precursor of our
present-day legal system is more than
an anachronism now-it is a rusting,
antiquated reminder of the law's humble beginnings. It is noteworthy only
because it marks the transition from
such medieval concepts as Star Chamber, "wager of law" and "trial by
jury" to our modern photosynthetic
jurisprudence.
The years from 1968 to 1974 were
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years of trial and error, testing, experimcnting and programming. The entire
case law of American jurisprudence was
reduced to I.B.M. cards, which were
then reproduced by the thousands and
made available to those schools and
law firms which had purchased (or
contracted to purchase) a suitable
"LEGIVAC". This name, incidentally,
was chosen by national lottery and was
submitted by an obscure Leavenworth
parolee, who was subsequently programmed innocent by the machine he
named. No one fully realized in those
early years how great had been the impact of the New York Experiment in
1968. But the utility of the I.B.M. system quickly caught on across the nation after Law Day in 1975. Let me explain.
By New Year's Day, 1975, it had become apparent that LEGIVACs had
made law books of all types unnecessary. Shepard's Citations had folded.
West had cut its digest division to a
skeleton crew of seven third-year law
students who had had special prelaw
training as I.B.M. technicians. Law
books of all types were gathering dust
in libraries everywhere (except, of
course, in those smaller law schools
that could not afford or accommodate
a full-sized LEGIVAC). Court calendars were hopelessly backlogged because the judges could not keep pace
with litigation whose paperwork was
completed in minutes.
This last circumstance caused the
Ohio legislature to react with fantastic
foresight at its opening session in
1975. It authorized a small electronics
firm in Cincinnati to design a "JUDIVAC" capable of analyzing the research of two or more LEGIVACs and
resolving the controversy in the light
of all the applicable precedent. The experiments were successful, and the legislature viewed a secret demonstration
in early April, in which the JUDIVAC
resolved an action brought under the
state's "little Norris-LaGuardia Act" in
two minutes and forty-seven seconds.
Braced by the electronics firm's thirty-year warranty, the Ohio legislature,
on Law Day, 1975, summarily relieved
all circuit court judges of their duties
and ordered the installation of JUDIVACs throughout the state. Their operational efficiency was incredible.

Jurimetrics, No!
Trial calendar backlog of up to twenty-seven months was reduced to the
three hours it took to program the machine. Extremely well-written and
well-reasoned opinions were simultaneously printed on bond (for the parties) and punched on I.B.M. cards (for
the records).
As quickly as the states could appropriate the money, JUDIVACs became, almost exclusively, the decisionmakers of our legal system. By 1981
every state in the union used JUDIVACs at least in its intermediate appellate system, arid most had procured
S-model JUDIVACs to replace the supreme bench of the state.
About this time more inexpensive
LEGIVACs appeared on the market.
Most were manufactured and programmed by Toshida, Ltd., a Japanese
transistor firm which had accurately
anticipated the need for more LEGIVACs. Every law office and general
practitioner was able to own one,
though partnerships often pooled their
finances to purchase one that was capable not only of research but also of advocacy. By careful programming, these
machines could argue law, facts and
policy, could analogize and distinguish cases, could misread, misquote
and at times even cite dicta.
Law school enrollments had begun a
decline about 1976. The inevitability of
"punch-card" law was becoming more
and more apparent even then, and the
bigger law firms no longer sought the
top graduates from the "name" law
schools. More and more they looked to
M.I.T.. Carnegie Tech and other technical schools for associates and junior
partners.
Only the reluctance of the American
Bar Association to accept defeat prevented the formation in 1983 of a
huge jurisprudential cartel by I.B.M.,
Sperry-Rand, Minneapolis-Honeywell
(all in the United States), Gerard, Ltd.
(England), Telefunken, U.A. (Germany) and several smaller firms in the
Near East. The American Bar Association originally filed suit in the federal
district court for the Southern District
of New York, claiming Sherman Act
violations and unauthorized practice of
law. Judge McGohey construed the
problem as one of conflicts of law and
dismissed under the doctrine of forun

non conveniens. The Association then
sought to relitigate in the International
Court of Justice but was confronted
with the court JUDIVAC's preliminary
finding that the matter was res judicata. Although the litigation was fruitless, it did result in a compromise between the machine-makers and the Association, the formers' concession being that they would take no "overt action" to prevent the latter's members
from earning their livelihood.

Old Guard Refuses
To Accept Progress
You can understand, I am sure, the
tumultuous upheaval in the law during
these years. What had previously been
the core of the common law-mental
research, verbal juggling, sociological
and pragmatic fact-finding, idealistic
and naturalistic conccptualization-was being pared away by the machinations of LEGIVACs and JUDIVACs
of every variety. The theorists were understandably indignant: "Just as the
foot soldier will never be eliminated
from war, so the human intellect can
never be stricken from the common
law", harangued The New York Times.
The logical error, of course, is obvious: War need not continue eternally
confined to the stratagems of Moltke,
Montgomery or McNamara; so too,
the "law" of the classicists need not remain infinitely mired in the trenches of
human advocacy and decision. But despite the objections of persons and
groups, the trend to electronic stare decisis continued unabated.
It is not within my competence to
describe precisely and definitively how
these computers operate. Essentially,
the problem is to translate legal vocabulary and "thought-segments" into geometric designs on punched I.B.M. cards.
Facts and holdings are obviously the
easiest to transcribe, but great advances have been made in the methods of hole-punching "innuendos", "alternatives", "rationalizations", "public
policies" and "equities". Where human
judges have been replaced by JUDIVACs, the "clerk-programmer" now
assumes a more important role than in
yesteryear. Previously, of course, a
mere clerk could have little or no effect
on the outcome of cases; but now a
clerk-programmer actively feeds into

the machine's judicial consciousness
only those possibilities that will not
clog the "adjudicator's" mechanism,
and hence its efficiency.
Wary of creating a deus ex ma.
china, the states until 1980 had refrained from using JUDIVACs in equity cases in their courts; obviously, they felt that no legal system
should be devoid of any possibility of
human error. But in 1980 the work of
a young professor of comparative law
at the University of Southern Califor.
nia gained national prominence and
the immediate attention of state solons.
Professor Dubin had demonstrated
that it was possible, in the confines of
the English language, to distill the essence of equity jurisprudence from the
written words of men now dead and
courts long since defunct. His theory
on the "maximum-minimum result-or.
iented precedent value syndrome" provided the key for programming the E(for equity) model JUDIVAC, and
states were quick to utilize the technique. The nub of the transition was in
requiring both plaintiff and defendant
in equity cases to submit to cerebralelectrode-analysis in the courtroom
(vaguely similar to the antique "lie-detector" test). The simplicity of this
method was overwhelming: It required
only the minor change from the
"clean-hands" doctrine to the "cleanminds" rationale.
Once proved, the E-JUDIVAC was
assimilated by the states at a rapid
rate. Different styles were available,
depending on the social conscience factors in the intended jurisdiction. New
England procured several of the "Lord
Eldon" models- the Southern states
usually requested the "Roger Taney"
machines (except Louisiana, of course,
which imported a "Napoleon", manufactured and coded in Renault's Vichy
plant). The Western states acquired
many later models, catalogued only as
"New Frontier Justice".
Lawyers

Find Employment

in Other Places
You may wonder about the huge unemployment problems created by the
adoption of these machines. True,
there was some difficulty, but it reflects
credit on the initiative and responsibil-
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ity of our federal system that the states
could absorb this excess manpower
successfully. Many judges made the
transition from courtroom to stage,
screen and television effortlessly, many
of the nation's top trial attorneys were
employed happily in Hollywood as extras in an epic remake of Gone With
the Wind. Less fortunate lawyers accepted Ford Foundation grants for
manual retraining: the more dexterous
became key-punch operators, while
those with wavering hand but steady
concentration became programmers.
The Federal Government set up a special CCC program (Court Clerks Congress) in which clerks key-punched
cards and cleaned the courthouse during the summer retooling period. These
and similar efforts prevented any inequitable distribution of the unemployment burden.
Thus, you have a pretty good de.
scription of our state-level court system
up until the early 1980's. There was in
fact a leveling-off period at that time.
Since the states had committed themselves to litigation by electronics, the
only changes were minor ones, caused
by scientific advances in computer programming, construction and mainte-
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nance.
To keep the ledger in balance, I
must add that a new form of American
enterprise blossomed at this time-the
"consultomat". Since the bulk of our
law was processed by machinery, neither the Canons of Professional Ethics
nor the many state antibarratry statutes could be invoked to prevent private use of LEGIVACs or JUDIVACs
for consultation purposes. In almost
every community one or more merchants established a small emporium
where the layman could present his
legal problem to a bank of preprogrammed computers. Some shops had
attendants, but most were coin-operated the fee depending entirely on the
amount of time the machine took to
reach a conclusion. Though it was stipulated that the decisions of the consul
tomats were not binding, their opinions were prima facie evidence if the
controversy was later taken to an
official state court. The practical result
was a happy one. Much unnecessary
litigation was eliminated at a relatively
small cost to the prospective litigant.
(There was some trouble with vandals,
however, who evolved a game of submitting obscene major and minor
premises on punch cards, which would
usually jam the mechanism.)
Administration Bill Puts
JUDIVACs in the Saddle
The most important year in recent
legal history was 1984. President Reagan, in January of that year, submitted
to the Congress proposed legislation
which in substance struck from the
books the Judiciary Act of 1789 and
all its progeny which in any way regulated the personnel of federal district
and circuit courts. In their place the
President called for the purchase of
late-model JUDIVACs for the entire
federal judiciary. Although the opposition of some members of the old Johnson administration was bitter, it was
disorganized, and the bill was enacted
in May of 1984. The repercussions
were thunderous. The popular hue and
cry was based on the historical debates
of our nation's founders, who certainly
(it was said) never envisioned a legal
system comprised solely of intellectual
robots.
President Reagan stood fast; he
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cited in return that undebatable axiom
of John Marshall's-"This is a government of laws and not of men"--and
the average citizen nodded his head approvingly. "Too damn much politics in
the federal courts anyway", exclaimed
several random interviewees in San
Francisco. Opposition to the sweeping
bill was sporadic, however, and not always of the highest caliber, since the
best legal minds had long since deserted the profession for some other
field offering employment security. The
many federal district court judges hastily formed a collective bargaining
unit, but this was labeled a "pseudounion" by the NLRB (exempt, as an
administrative body, from the proposed judicial reform) and struck
down.
On a higher level, the federal circuit
judges called for a national referendun on the question. But the electronics lobby prevented any enabling legislation from gaining a foothold in committee. The F-model JUDIVACs were
installed simultaneously in every federal courthouse on July 4, 1984, amid
patriotic reaffirmations of our colonial
heritage and our constitutional form of
government. The date also was conveniently in the midst of summer recess so
the machines had several months to
practice their motions, certificates and
restraint.
There were, understandably, some
tragic personal misfortunes resulting
from the year 1984. The most noteworthy was probably that of Professor
Moore, who had prepared a second series of his monumental treatise on federal practice. The publication date had
been set to coincide with the opening
of the October Term of the Supreme
Court, which, of course, would have
been a futile gesture in the light of developments. His life's work rendered
nugatory, Professor Moore applied for
federal job retraining under the Johnson plan but was rejected because of
the instability of his political views.
Once operating, the F-JUDIVACs
proved eminently practical and noncontroversial. In fact, the Second Circuit machine injected a note of humor
into the judicial arena by reversing a
ruling of the General Accounting Office
that had upheld the validity of the con-
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tract under which the F-JUDIVACs
were purchased. The staccato reasoning was that the procuring office (the
Justice Department) had indeed let the
contract to the lowest bidder but had
failed to find it a "qualified" bidder.
As in most "preventive wars", tactics were limited by strategy, which, in
turn, was limited by the competence of
the strategists, and the battle against
tin-can jurisprudence was lost. The last
objectors conceded defeat in 1987,
much to President Reagan's personal
satisfaction. He retired to the Presidential retreat in Death Valley over Labor
Day with a smug smile; when he returned to Washington, the smile had
become a broad grin. And with good
reason. His most cherished legislative
crop was ripe for harvesting.
Supreme Court Suffers
Electronic Eclipse
When he submitted the proposed
constitutional amendment to Congress,
there was scarcely a murmur of protest. Within six months every state (except New York and Illinois) bad ratified the amendment calling for abolition of the offices of Chief Justice and
Associate Justice of the United States
Supreme Court. Instead, an elaborate
procedure was established whereby the
President was to "nominate" nine of
the most outstanding JUDIVACs in the
country for positions on the High-Voltage Bench. The Congress was then to

review the operational efficiency of
these machines, their maintenance
costs and their geographic origins, and
to approve or reject the "appointees". When accepted by Congress, they
were to be trundled to Washington and
installed side by side in the old Supreme Court Building.
There were several controversial features of the amendment as first submitted. First, Reagan had suggested that
the "nominee" machines must have
previously served in either the state or
federal court system. This clause was
stricken by Congress, which felt that
each machine should be judged on its
own merits: Even if it had rendered
conspicuous service only in a private
law firm, or in a corner consultomat,
it should still be eligible for promotion.
Second, Congress felt that the nine
JUDIVACs should be electrically connected in series. The states were unwilling to accept the amendment in this
form since they felt it would stifle the
advantages inherent in using machines
that had been programmed independently in varying years and jurisdictions. Thus, when the October Term
began in 1987, there was for a time
hopeless confusion among the nine behemoths. No two opinions could be reconciled with each other, let alone with
a majority of the Court. But these inconsistent adjudications were then
reanalyzed by an outstanding LEGI-

VAC, and a "synthesizing syndrome"
was programmed into each of the nine
SC-model JUDIVACs. More understandable results were soon forthcoming.
Strangely, despite these corrections,
the Court continued to decide cases
somewhat ambivalently. In some cases
the machines would hum smoothly, in
perfect synchronization, and produce a
single, simple decision. But more often
there was an audible gnashing of gears
as one or more of the "justiciatons"
found it physically and electronically
impossible to agree with its fellows.
Separate opinions were often returned,
and there was even an occasional short
circuit when a machine tried to outdo
its adjudicating capacitors.
Science has been attacking this last
weakness of our legal system, and the
profession expects an answer shortly.
The Bar does not seem to be disturbed
by the apparent inconsistency of its
own profession: On the human level it
seeks continuously for greater individuality; but it is content to watch our
jurisprudence settle into a morass of
homogeneity, certainty and utter predictability.
Thus, you have it. From the first experiment in the 1960's the die apparently was cast, and now the machinery
of the law, rid of its human millstone,
purrs inscrutably and efficiently onward. Lord help us all!

century-long westward pushing of the
frontier was impelled by discontent.
And almost every significant measure
of social, economic and even juristic
progress that we have achieved in the
crowded years since has come about in
an almost continuing response to discontent.
Let us who occupy positions of leadership in a powerful and disciplined
calling use our formidable resources to
turn in our time the discontent that
wracks our society into yet another
constructive chapter in the contribution of our profession to the progress
of this nation. Let us respond to discontent-not ignore it. Let us direct it

into creative channels-not contest it.
We are living in a time of ordeal
and of challenge. We cannot do business as usual. We must persuade, when
many no longer want to listen. And we
must act, when many have lost faith in
our action. But the active belief in a
society of laws that led us into this
profession must reassert itself, whatever the odds.
For the only alternative to law and
order is anarchy. And as James Madison, the chief architect of our Constitution, said nearly two centuries ago,
"Anarchy ever has, and I fear ever
will, produce despotism."

President's Page
(Continued from page 873)
ment of the law against all violators,
especially those who would destroy our
institutions by violent action; and second to open to the restless and the de.
prived among our people full participation in the lawful procedures that are
the only effective means of social
change.
But let us not be frightened by manifestations of discontent. Discontent is
not a scare word in America. It is a
brave word. It is not a negative word.
It is a positive word. This land was settled by the discontented. Its independence, its nationhood and, indeed, its
and
Constitution were conceived
created in response to discontent. The
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